



Human Rights Violations by the Executive:




Citation for published version (Harvard):
Enonchong, N 2003, 'Human Rights Violations by the Executive: Complicity of the Judiciary in Cameroon?',
Journal of African Law, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 265-274. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021855303002122
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
Journal of African Law, 47, 2 (2003), 265–274 # School of Oriental and African Studies.
DOI: 10.1017/S0021855303002122 Printed in the United Kingdom.
CASE NOTE
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE EXECUTIVE: COMPLICITY OF THE
JUDICIARY IN CAMEROON?
The People v. Nya Henry
The People v. Dr. Martin Luma
INTRODUCTION
In a previous article in this journal,1 on remedies in national law for breach
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter),
the decision of a magistrate in the Cameroonian case ofThe People v.Nya Henry
was discussed in detail. In that case the department in charge of public
prosecutions (the Legal Department) had, in breach of a court order, refused
to release the defendants on bail. The magistrate held that that action of
the Legal Department amounted to a violation of the defendants’ right to the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Cameroon constitution and the
African Charter. As a remedy, the magistrate stayed the proceedings and
ordered the release of the defendants. That decision was hailed as one of the
few ‘‘courageous and bold’’ decisions in a gradually rising tide of judicial
protection of human rights in Africa and in Cameroon in particular.2 But, in
two recent judgments,3 the Court of Appeal has now reversed that decision
together with the original decision admitting the defendants to bail.
This note examines the two judgments of the Court of Appeal and the
reasons advanced for reversing the decisions of the magistrate. It will endea-
vour to show that the two decisions of the Court of Appeal are not well
founded in law. The decision of the court on the issue of stay of proceedings
will be examined first before considering the decision on the question of bail.
STAY OF PROCEEDINGS: JUDICIAL FAILURE TO
CONDEMN EXECUTIVE MISCONDUCT
It will be submitted that on the issue of stay of proceedings on the ground of
abuse of process by the executive the Court of Appeal misapplied the law. The
impartiality of the court will also be questioned. However, it is helpful to
begin with an account of the actual decision of the court.
The decision
The facts of the case are simple. The defendants, who had been arrested on
1 October, 2001, applied to a Magistrate for an order admitting them to bail.
In a ruling on 24 October the Magistrate, Bea Abednego, granted them bail
1 N. Enonchong, [2002] 46 J.A.L. 197.
2 Ibid., at 198.
3 The People v. Nya Henry Tichandum (22 August, 2002), Appeal No. BCA/MS/11C/2002,
unreported, and The People v. Dr Martin Luma (22 August, 2002), Appeal No. BCA/MS/8C/2002.
and ordered their release. But the Legal Department defied the court order.
Instead on 29 October the Department brought the defendants before the
same Magistrate charged with two offences.4 The issue arose whether their
continued detention in breach of the bail order amounted to a violation of the
defendants’ right to the presumption of innocence. The magistrate answered
that question in the affirmative and, as a remedy, he stayed the proceedings
and ordered the release of the defendants.5 On appeal by the Legal Depart-
ment the Court of Appeal (MOFAW, C.J., MOUTCHIA and TUME, J.J.)
reversed the ruling of the magistrate, set aside his order and ordered a retrial
of the defendants.
In order to see more clearly the fallacies in this judgment, it is helpful to
note the grounds of appeal and the way in which the Court of Appeal dealt
with them. There were three main grounds of appeal.6 First, that the magis-
trate ‘‘failed to arraign all the defendants’’. Second, that the magistrate ‘‘did
not give any opportunity to the prosecution to call any of its witnesses to prove
its case’’. And, third, that the magistrate ‘‘erred in dismissing the case under
section 301(1) [of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance] when no trial was
conducted.’’ All three grounds of appeal complained in essence that the
magistrate did not proceed with the trial as normal and instead stopped the
proceedings before it got off the ground.
It was argued for the respondents that in effect the issue for the Court of
Appeal to decide was whether the magistrate’s decision to stop the proceed-
ings and deprive the prosecution of the opportunity to prove the guilt of the
defendants was wrong in law. To that question, counsel for the respondents
contended that the answer is clearly in the negative. Counsel relied on
Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions7 for the proposition that the court has
general and inherent powers to protect its process from abuse. The magistrate
in this case, it was argued, simply stopped the proceedings in order to protect
the process of the court from abuse by the prosecution who had been involved
in unlawful conduct by disobeying a court order and detaining the defendants
in contravention of the law. To put it another way, the Legal Department
committed an illegal act and violated the human rights of the defendants by
the continued illegal detention. The Department then sought to use or rather
abuse the process of the court as a means to continue to violate the human
rights of the defendants. No court should allow its process to be abused in this
way. The jurisdiction to stay proceedings exists to prevent such abuse. The
magistrate, it was argued, was right to exercise that jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeal rejected the submissions of the respondents and found
for the prosecution on all the grounds of appeal. The court took the view that
the magistrate should have allowed the trial to continue in the normal way in
4 One, for unlawful assembly under s. 231 of the Penal Code (punishable by imprisonment for a
period between 15 days to 6 months and with a fine of from 5,000–100,000 francs CFA), and the
other offence was for failing to obey a prefectorial order, punishable under s. R 370(12) of the
Penal Code (imprisonment of from 5–10 days or a fine of from 4,000–25,000 francs or with both
imprisonment and fine). This second offence is a minor offence. It is classified by the Penal Code
as a ‘‘simple offence of the fourth class’’.
5 The Magistrate did so under s. 301(1) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance.
6 There was a fourth ground of appeal, that the magistrate erred in holding that an appeal does
not lie against an interlocutory decision, but that was not a crucial part of the case and this note
will not go into it.
7 [1964] AC 1254, 1354.
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spite of the undisputed illegal conduct of the Legal Department.
MOUTCHIA, J., delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said that
‘‘the prosecution was not given the chance to make their complaint. The
trial court, instead of acting as an arbiter, descended into the arena and
stopped both the prosecution and the defence from saying anything in the
name of preventing abuse of court process. It was a complete departure from
any known legal procedure.’’ It is submitted that this view of the Court of
Appeal has no support either in principle or in authority.
Stay of proceedings to prevent abuse of process
The jurisdiction of the court to stay proceedings in order to prevent abuse of
process is well founded as a matter of principle. The existence of the power
and duty to stay proceedings to prevent abuse of process is a fundamental
principle of the rule of law. This is because it is an important means by which
the court can ensure that executive agents of the state do not oppress citizens
by misusing the coercive functions of the court. It is no surprise, therefore, to
see that this jurisdiction to stay proceedings in order to prevent abuse of
process is well established in Commonwealth jurisdictions. In R v. Horseferry
Road Magistrates’ Court, Ex p Bennett,8 for example, the House of Lords held
that the court has jurisdiction to stay proceedings and order the release of the
accused when the court becomes aware that there has been a serious abuse of
power by the executive. By exercising this jurisdiction the court can refuse to
allow the police or the prosecuting authorities to take advantage of their abuse
of power (such as illegal detention or kidnapping). This is done by the court
regarding that abuse of power as an abuse of the court’s process. In Ex p
Bennett the accused had been kidnapped abroad with the collusion of the UK
police and brought to stand trial in England. The involvement of the UK
police in the breach of international law meant that they were involved in
illegal conduct. It was held by the House of Lords that the court had
jurisdiction to stay the proceedings as an abuse of the process of the court.
Lord Griffiths said that this jurisdiction is necessary to enable the court to
refuse to countenance misconduct by the executive which threatens (a) basic
human rights and (b) the rule of law. More recently in R v. Looseley (where
executive agents of the state were involved in entrapment) Lord Nicholls of
Birkenhead opened his judgment with these words: ‘‘Every court has an
inherent power and duty to prevent abuse of its process. This is a fundamental
principle of the rule of law.’’9
It is not easy to understand how the Court of Appeal in Cameroon could
come to the view that by granting a stay of proceedings, in the exercise of the
inherent power and duty of the court to prevent abuse of its process, the trial
magistrate did something which was ‘‘a complete departure from any known
procedure’’. It would appear that the Court of Appeal was under the impres-
sion that the magistrate should first have conducted the trial in the normal
way by allowing the prosecution to make their complaint, to call their
witnesses, and so on. Only at the end of the trial should the magistrate have
8 [1994] 1 AC 42.
9 [2001] UKHL 53; [2001] 1 WLR 2060, para 1.
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considered whether there was an abuse of process. But this misses the point
completely. The point is that in the light of the misconduct of the prosecuting
authorities (the executive) there should be no trial at all. The misconduct of
the executive goes to the propriety of there being a prosecution at all for the
relevant offence.10 The question is not whether the proceedings would be a
fair determination of guilt, but whether the proceedings should have been
brought at all. To put it another way, by granting a stay of proceedings, the
court is saying that no valid trial could take place at all. So, the question of
fairness of the trial in determining guilt or otherwise does not arise.
The Court of Appeal seemed concerned with the fairness of the proceedings
when it complained that the fact that the magistrate did not allow the
prosecution or the defence to make an opening address and to call witnesses
meant that ‘‘both sides were cheated’’.11 But this shows that the court was
confusing two very distinct and separate issues: the fairness of the proceedings
and a stay of proceedings as an abuse of process. A stay of proceedings to
prevent abuse of process is granted not because the accused was not guilty or
because he could not receive a fair trial but to prevent abuse of the court’s
process and thereby protect the integrity of the criminal justice system. A stay
in this context is, as Lord Hoffmann has described it, ‘‘a jurisdiction to prevent
abuse of executive power’’.12 So, in the Nya Henry case the question was not
whether a fair trial was possible or not. It may be that a fair trial was possible.
Yet the issue was whether, despite the fact that a fair trial was possible, the
court will be failing in its duty to protect its process from abuse if it did not
intervene to stay the proceedings once it became aware of the misconduct of
the executive. If, as in Nya Henry, the circumstances are such that because of
the misconduct of the Legal Department the prosecution ought not to be
allowed at all, then it is idle for the Court of Appeal to complain that the court
did not give the prosecution the chance to make their complaint and to call
their witnesses. There is therefore no justification in principle for the view of
the Court of Appeal that the court has no power to stay its proceedings to
prevent abuse of process.
Devoid of any sound basis in principle, the decision of the Court of Appeal
is also ill-founded as a matter of authority. There is no binding authority
which compelled the Court of Appeal to this deplorable decision. Indeed, no
authority whatsoever was cited by the Court of Appeal in support of the view
that the court does not have inherent powers to stay proceedings to prevent
abuse of process. No statute was cited, no Cameroonian case was relied upon.
Not even a foreign decision was referred to as supporting that view of the
Court of Appeal. On the contrary, the respondents cited Connelly v. DPP13 as
persuasive authority for the view that ‘‘the court has general and inherent
powers to protect its process from abuse’’.14 But the Court of Appeal failed to
address this point and made no comment at all on Connelly’s case. It is plain
to see that the decision of the Court of Appeal on the issue of stay leaves much
to be desired.
10 Cf. [2001] 1 WLR 2060, para. 17, per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead and para. 36, per Lord
Hoffman.
11 P. 3, line 20 of the judgment.
12 R. v. Looseley [2001] 1 WLR 2060, para. 40.
13 [1964] AC 1245, 1354–1355.
14 P. 4, lines 10–12, of the Court of Appeal judgment.
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(Im)partial court?
A sad and shameful aspect of this case is that the Court of Appeal was
blatantly more concerned with ‘‘justice’’ for the prosecution than with the
human rights of the accused. For, although, as noted above, the Court
appeared to be complaining that both sides had been cheated, it is clear
that the court was more concerned with ‘‘fairness’’ to the prosecution. Thus
the court completely ignored the serious abuse of power committed by the
prosecuting authorities who had disobeyed a court order and violated the
human rights of the accused by keeping them in detention without lawful
excuse. It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeal did not dispute the
fact that the Procureur General, the head of the Legal Department in the
province, gave instructions that the order of the magistrate (that the defen-
dants be released on bail) should not be obeyed. Nor did the court deny that
the action of the Procureur General amounted to a violation of the defen-
dants’ right to the presumption of innocence and their right not to be detained
without lawful excuse. Yet nowhere in the judgment of the Court of Appeal
can one find even a hint of disapproval of this outrageous conduct of the
prosecuting authorities.
This is a case where the prosecuting authorities violated basic human rights
and trampled upon the rule of law. Instead of refusing to countenance such
dangerous behaviour, as the magistrate did, the judges in the Court of Appeal
have, by their silence, condoned it. Indeed, it is not too much to say that, by
their deliberate failure to act, the judges in the Court of Appeal have parti-
cipated in the misconduct of the executive; they have colluded in the human
rights violations inflicted upon the defendants.
Why, it may be asked, were the judges in the Court of Appeal so blatantly
partial towards the executive? The answer, it is suggested, lies in the lack of
judicial independence in Cameroon.15 It is no secret that the system of
appointment, promotion, and transfer of judges in Cameroon is one which
ensures that judges are at the mercy of the executive and therefore extremely
vulnerable to pressure from the executive.16 As one human rights NGO has
stated,17 the judiciary in Cameroon ‘‘lacks independence’’ and is ‘‘vulnerable
to political influence’’. And there is little doubt that the two cases under
comment are cases in which the executive was particularly interested because
of its significant political implications. The Government has long been
anxious to counteract the political activities of the movement (the SCNC18)
of which the defendants were members. This movement has been campaign-
ing for secession of the Southern Cameroons from the Republic of Cameroon.
And the demonstrations which led to the arrests of the defendants were
demonstrations calling for or celebrating the separate statehood of Southern
Cameroons. It appears that the Government had attempted, through the
15 The practice is very different from what is proclaimed in Article 37(2) of the Constitution
that the judiciary ‘‘shall be independent of the executive and legislative powers’’.
16 The source of this judicial submissiveness to the executive is Article 37(3) of the Constitution
which puts the absolute and unfettered power to appoint, promote, and discipline judges all in the
hands of the President of the Republic, the head of the executive arm of the state.
17 Human Rights Watch, Report on Cameroon, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/africa/
cameroon/cameroon.html.
18 Short for, ‘‘Southern Cameroons National Council’’.
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President of the Bamenda Court of Appeal, to lean on the magistrate not to
release the defendants. But the magistrate resisted the pressure and asserted
his independence by deciding the case according to ‘‘the law and [his] con-
science’’, as required by Article 37(2) of the Constitution. Sadly, as we now
know,19 he paid for this with his career. He was removed from the bench and
sent to serve as an official in the office of the Legal Department in the South
West Province.20 It is extremely likely that judges in the Court of Appeal,
seeing what happened to the magistrate as a result of his decision against the
wishes of the Government, needed no direct pressure or threats to know which
way to decide the appeal, if they wished to stay on the bench or even to
continue to aspire for promotion.
THE ISSUE OF BAIL: JUDICIAL VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
The decision
The second judgment of the Court of Appeal in the same saga concerned
the decision of the magistrate to order the release of the defendants on bail. As
already indicated, the defendants were arrested and detained on 1 October,
2001. Three days later, they had not yet been charged or released. On
4 October, through their counsel, they filed a motion on notice, praying the
court for an order that they be released on bail pending any charges against
them. The application for bail was supported by an affidavit which was served
on the respondents, the Legal Department, on 18 October. At the hearing, on
24 October, counsel for the respondents made a preliminary application for
the matter to be adjourned to enable the Legal Department to file a counter-
affidavit on which they claimed they were still working. The magistrate
refused the application, proceeded to hear the application for bail and
admitted each applicant to bail. On appeal by the prosecution, the Court of
Appeal (MORFAW, C.J., BAWAK and MOUTCHIA, J.J.)21 set aside the decision
of the magistrate. The appeal raised just one question; whether the magistrate
was wrong to have granted bail to the applicants when the prosecution had
asked for an adjournment in order to prepare their counter-affidavit. The
Court of Appeal answered that question in the affirmative.
Two reasons were advanced by the court for its decision. The first is that
one of the factors normally taken into account when deciding whether or not
to grant bail is whether the applicant had a previous conviction, and in the
absence of a counter-affidavit ‘‘this vital information was unavailable to the
court.’’ Therefore, the Court of Appeal said, it was wrong for the magistrate to
have granted bail without this information. The applicants had argued that
this was an urgent application in a case where ‘‘some of the applicants are sick
and others are of old age’’.22 Their argument was that by the applicable rules
19 See N. Enonchong, [2002] 46 J.A.L. 197, 215.
20 This is a punishment commonly visited upon judges who attempt to go against the govern-
ment line.
21 The People v. Dr Martin Luma (2002) BCA/MS/8c/2002, unreported.
22 Dr Luma & 18 Ors v. The People (2001) BA/13m/01-02, unreported, p. 1.
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the time limit for the Legal Department to file a counter-affidavit in an urgent
application of this type was 48 hours. Since the Legal Department was served
on 18 October, it had had at least five clear days—more than enough time—
to prepare and file the counter-affidavit. Therefore, it was argued, the appli-
cation for further extra time was rightly rejected because it was dilatory. But
this contention was brushed aside by the Court of Appeal. The court took the
view that the Legal Department was entitled to additional extra time to
prepare and file their counter-affidavit in this case. Why?
Excessive sympathy for the prosecution
The only reason given by the Court of Appeal was that the matter was
‘‘serious and needed proper investigation for the appellants to come up with a
counter affidavit’’. Yet the Court of Appeal failed to identify the circum-
stances which made this case such a special case to warrant so much addi-
tional time for the Legal Department to prepare a counter-affidavit. Surely it
was not enough for the Court of Appeal simply to say that this was a serious
matter. Indeed the charges ultimately laid against the defendants (under
sections 231 and R 370(12) of the Penal Code23) do not support this view.
This reason is therefore not a convincing justification for the Court of Appeal
to disturb the order of the magistrate.24
Moreover, even if it is accepted that more time was needed in this case, the
Legal Department had already had more than double the usual time allowed.
Why was the Court of Appeal prepared to give the Legal Department addi-
tional extra time? The Legal Department was served with the affidavit of the
applicants on 18 October. The hearing took place on 24 October. This means
that by the date of the hearing the respondents had had five days within
which to prepare their counter-affidavit. During the hearing they asked for an
adjournment until 29 October—in other words asking for a total of 11 days to
prepare the counter-affidavit rather than the usual 48 hours. The magistrate
did not think this to be right. But the Court of Appeal found it necessary to
23 These are not serious offences. None is punishable with imprisonment for more than six
months (see, n. 4 above). Indeed the maximum sentence for the offence under s. R 370(12) is
10 days imprisonment or such imprisonment and fine not exceeding CFA 25,000, the equivalent
of roughly £25 (pounds sterling).
24 Another gripe of the Court of Appeal was that although the record of proceedings shows that
counsel for the prosecution said in court that ‘‘We are strongly opposed to the prayers of the
[applicants]’’ yet the magistrate ‘‘embarrassingly’’ stated that ‘‘The Respondents are not opposed
to the prayers of the applicants.’’ This criticism by the Court of Appeal suggests that the magistrate
misheard the respondents or deliberately misstated what counsel for the respondents said. But this
is not the case. The truth is that the Court of Appeal missed the point completely. The point is
that it had been submitted for the applicants (at p. 2, lines 27–29 of the records of proceedings)
that since the respondents, the Legal Department, had failed to file a counter-affidavit, ‘‘the
presumption is that the Legal Department is not minded to oppose the application.’’ That
presumption is not rebutted by a bare statement that ‘‘we are strongly opposed to the applica-
tion’’. So, after hearing both sides, the magistrate’s conclusion was that the presumption applied,
since it had not been rebutted. Hence his statement that ‘‘the respondents are not opposed to the
prayers of the applicants’’. The Court of Appeal judges misunderstood this statement because they
read it without reference to the legal arguments canvassed at the bar. It may be that perhaps the
magistrate could have stated more distinctly that he was applying the presumption contended for
by the applicants, but, in my view, it is sufficiently clear from the record of the ruling that that is
what he did, when he made the statement which the Court of Appeal finds embarrassing.
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give the Legal Department such extra time in a case where the defendants
were eventually charged with two simple offences.25
A question which presents itself at this stage is this, why was the Court of
Appeal bending over backwards to help the Legal Department? And why is it
that the Court of Appeal showed no concern whatsoever for the liberty of the
applicants who were still in detention, without charge? Why did the court fail
even to mention the liberty of the detainees and the protection of their human
rights as one of the factors to be taken into account in deciding whether or not
to grant bail?
Violation of the applicants' right to the presumption of innocence
The second reason advanced by the Court of Appeal for setting aside the
decision of the magistrate also stems from the shocking fact that at the time of
the hearing, some 24 days after their original arrest and detention, the
applicants had not yet been charged. Some might think that this fact alone
would be a cause for concern to any judge. Yet the judges in the Bamenda
Court of Appeal used the fact that the applicants had not yet been charged as
a reason why bail should not have been granted. Their rather bizarre argu-
ment was that since there had been no charges yet, the magistrate did not
know whether any charge which may subsequently be made would ‘‘be
bailable or not’’. Consequently bail should not have been granted just in
case the charge, if any, eventually made turns out to be one where bail was
not available. This is astonishing. What the Court of Appeal was saying is that
because the Legal Department had failed to prefer charges on time, the
magistrate should have presumed (against the detainees) that any charges
preferred will not be bailable and, on this basis, the court should have refused
bail. This reasoning is unattractive and should be rejected, for it punishes the
detainees (with continued detention) for the delay of the Legal Department.
If this view is adopted, it will make it possible for the Legal Department to use
pre-trial detention as punishment simply by delaying the preparation of the
counter-affidavit in a case of this kind. That would be an unsatisfactory
position for the law to be in considering its adverse effects on the liberty of
citizens.
It is interesting to observe that in the affidavit deposed to by the applicants’
counsel it was said that the applicants were arrested ‘‘during a peaceful
march’’. The Court of Appeal retorted, shamelessly, that ‘‘if the march was
peaceful why were the applicants now respondents arrested?’’ This statement
amounts to a clear breach of the applicants’ right to the presumption of
innocence.26 For, it clearly shows that the Court of Appeal had already
made up its mind that, because the applicants had been arrested, they must
have been guilty of some wrongdoing. This presumption of guilt perhaps
explains the appalling decision of the court on the issue of stay of proceedings
discussed above. It may also explain why the Court of Appeal was prepared to
25 Indeed by the time of the hearing of the application for bail, the applicants had already been
detained for more than 10 days, which is the maximum sentence for one of the offences with which
they were subsequently charged (see n. 4 above).
26 For a discussion of the scope of the right to the presumption of innocence under the African
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, see, N. Enonchong, [2002] 46 J.A.L., 197, 200–203.
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allow the prosecution so much extra time to prepare and file their counter-
affidavit, in the full knowledge that in the meantime the applicants remained
in detention. The judges of the Court of Appeal were not worried by the long
period that the applicants had spent in detention without charge because the
judges had already concluded that the applicants were guilty. It is not too
much to say that by presuming the applicants guilty and refusing them bail as
a result, the learned judges of the Court of Appeal were colluding with the
Legal Department to use pre-trial detention as a punishment.
The use of pre-trial detention as punishment is not uncommon in
Cameroon. As Sir Nigel Rodley, the U.N. Special Rapporteur, has
observed,27 it is common knowledge that in Cameroon pre-trial detention is
widely used by the executive (police and prosecuting authorities) as a form of
punishment rather than for its primary goal of upholding order and security
or facilitating investigations. This is disturbing and has already been justly
condemned elsewhere.28 What is more worrying about this decision of the
Court of Appeal is that it indicates that senior members of the judiciary are
now willing to participate in this appalling violation of human rights.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in the Nya Henry case is not only
devoid of legal basis, it constitutes a threat to the rule of law and to basic
human rights. For it takes away from the judiciary an important weapon in
their limited armoury designed to promote the rule of law and protect basic
human rights. The decision is likely to encourage executive agents of the state
to continue to oppress ordinary citizens by abusing the coercive functions of
the court. It is therefore hoped that this disgraceful decision will be rejected at
the earliest opportunity. The decision of the Court of Appeal on the question
of bail is no less deplorable. By presuming the applicants guilty and using that
as a ground to refuse them bail, the Court of Appeal itself committed a breach
of the applicants’ right to the presumption of innocence and joined with the
executive in the appalling practice of using pre-trial detention as punishment.
This is also a shameful decision which should be disowned by the Supreme
Court and other courts not bound by it whenever the opportunity presents
itself.
The manifest partiality of the Court of Appeal in both decisions is a strong
hint of the lack of judicial independence in Cameroon. This is a long-standing
problem. It has been said that ‘‘forty years after [national] independence, the
judiciary [in Cameroon] still has to fight to gain its own independence.’’29
The two decisions of the Court of Appeal under discussion appear to indicate
that some senior members of the judiciary have given up the fight for judicial
independence, preferring instead to collude with the executive in human
rights violations. Lord Denning once classified judges into ‘‘bold spirits’’,
27 See e.g. E/CN.4/2000/9/Add.2, Report of the UN Special Rapporteur, submitted pursuant
to UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/38, paras. 52 and 53.
28 Ibid.
29 Innocent Bonu, Esq, ‘‘Neglect of the Judiciary’’ (2002) 1 Cameroon Common Law Journal 5,
para. 4.
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who would allow new causes of action, and ‘‘timorous souls’’, who would not.30
In the context of the Nya Henry and Dr Martin Luma cases, it is clear that the
magistrate, Bea Abednego, falls into the first class and the judges of the Court
of Appeal who reversed him belong to the second.
NELSON ENONCHONG*
30 Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. [1951] 2 KB 164, 178.
* Barber Professor of Law, University of Birmingham. I am grateful to Professor Andrew Choo
for reading an earlier draft of this comment.
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